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Marine protected areas and pelagic ﬁshing: The case of the Chagos ArchipelagoMost marine protected areas are only partially protected in that
they commonly permit ﬁshing, a primary ecosystem-distorting
activity. Many indeed are no more than ‘paper parks’. The creation
of no-take MPAs lags well behind several national declarations of
intent and certainly lags behind need. A letter calling for more of
these no-take zones has been signed by 250 of the world’s leading
scientists (http://www.globaloceanlegacy.org/).
Although the poor situation in the oceans is slowly changing, it
is not without opposition from the pelagic ﬁshing industry. A two
day workshop was held earlier this year in connection with pelagic
ﬁsheries and the creation of the Chagos Marine Protected Area.
This half a million square kilometres sits in the middle of the In-
dian Ocean where, amongst other things, pelagic ﬁsheries will be
prohibited from late 2010. It is a roughly circular zone about 450
nautical miles in diameter. Detailed aspects of this are in this issue
Koldewey et al. (2010). Chagos has a marvellously rich set of coral
reefs, which was the motive driving the MPA creation by the UK
government in the ﬁrst place, but it is also is a region where tuna
ﬁsheries once operated. The Chagos MPA will double the no-take
pelagic area in the oceans, but how signiﬁcant is this, both in quan-
titative terms and in terms of the change in attitude towards the
pelagic ﬁshing industry by placing such restrictions upon it?
The case for protection has long been clear for marine species
with low mobility, such as reef sharks and coral reef ﬁshes that
would clearly beneﬁt from zero ﬁshing mortality throughout their
home range throughout their annual cycle. But the most conten-
tious question occupied the most time – that of closure also to tuna
ﬁsheries. The workshop was not very important for any formal
conclusion which, apart from those unanimous and inevitable calls
for more research etc., was irreconcilably divided between the tuna
ﬁshers that were present and environmental scientists. But it was
illuminating for views gleaned during informal conversations be-
tween sessions. Those of us who have advocated no-take MPAs
were castigated by the industry on several issues. Firstly, we were
lectured, the area is too small to make any difference to the oceanic
tuna ﬁshery (so we should not bother to make it a no-take zone).
Others said the area was so big it will adversely affect the tuna
industry (so we should not make it a no-take zone). The tone of
the language used privately was sometimes arrogant and aggres-
sive, reﬂecting perhaps the presumed ownership that ﬁsheries
have exerted over the oceans. This ownership has been largely
unchallenged until recently, but now some governments are begin-
ning to designate large MPAs and, ﬁnally, to apply no-take status to
pelagic ﬁsheries.
Chagos is thus a test case in this sense. Some ﬁsheries propo-
nents claimed that the data are so poor for Indian Ocean tuna that
there was no science to back up a closure. So, of course, it shouldn’t
be closed. Another claimed the data from this part of the Ocean0025-326X/$ - see front matter  2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
doi:10.1016/j.marpolbul.2010.08.023were so good that we must not stop collecting more. And so on.
This kind of industry-favouring prevarication and obfuscation will
be familiar to any non-ﬁsheries scientist following ﬁsheries de-
bates over the last two decades. I think that the resolution of the
‘so poor’ vs ‘so good’ divide is that tuna data are in fact pretty good
in the Chagos area compared with other areas of that Ocean at
least, but that in scientiﬁc terms are still very feeble indeed. Thus
both are correct. The data are scarcely ﬁt for any useful purpose,
despite years of ﬁshing during which useful data could and should
have been collected; they certainly are too poor to easily be used to
determine whether or not a closure will have any effect on tuna
conservation or catches. Some in the tuna industry (the words
being put to me in the wings of the meeting) hope it might be
re-opened again soon – three years being a stated goal, when no
proof could be found to show a signiﬁcant change. Of course, it
was said, one way to gain the desired data would be to continue
the ﬁshery for scientiﬁc reasons: ‘scientiﬁc ﬁshing’ perhaps, like
‘scientiﬁc whaling’.
So let us look ﬁrst at some key aspects of tuna industry, and
what it is doing to the ocean.
1. Total catch
Of the total Indian Ocean tuna catch, Chagos provides, appar-
ently, only 2% by some measures (4 or even 6% by others). We
learned that the annual capture in the Indian Ocean is 30–40% of
the standing stock. To a population biologist that is a terrifying
high level, but the ﬁshing industry lives with such ﬁgures regu-
larly it seems, playing dangerously with the capital in the way re-
cently seen by gambling bankers. But, as with the recent banking
crisis, greatest chances are taken when it is not their own capital
they are playing with, and we can see the dismal results of both
industries around the world. Even that 30–40% ﬁgure is dubious:
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission itself has recently commis-
sioned a report that highlights many inadequacies of data and per-
formance (Anon, 2009). Even aside from the under reporting, an
independent assessment of the population trends (derived from
the ﬁsheries stock assessments) of the two main tuna ﬁsheries
in the Indian Ocean show that both the yellowﬁn and blueﬁn tuna
have declined to the point where they have breached the conser-
vationist benchmarks of concern and would qualify for listing by
the IUCN Red List as being Vulnerable (see Juan-Jorda et al.,
2010). In the much better investigated Atlantic tuna ﬁshery, it
was determined that under reporting was probably a factor of
2.5 (Sloan, 2006). Multiply, if you will, the 30–40% admitted cap-
ture by some unknown multiplier! Such under reporting is not
limited to the Atlantic: we might remember Japan’s admission of
under reporting its southern Blueﬁn tuna catch also, after it was
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s1765413.htm). It requires a ﬂight of fancy to imagine that tuna
ﬁshers are better behaved in the more anarchic Indian Ocean.
The inshore artisanal element, for example, is another large un-
known, and the ocean suffers from pervasive illegal and unregu-
lated ﬁshing.
2. Migratory catch
The argument was made that a tuna stock is presumed to be a
migratory species. What is not caught in the Chagos MPA could, if
it migrates, be caught elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, so what is the
point of protecting one part only? Numbers supporting or quanti-
fying this assertion were not produced or discussed in any mean-
ingful way, however. Of course some are migratory, possibly the
majority, but the key question in relation to the value of a large pe-
lagic protected zone is: what proportion? This is important, espe-
cially given the comments made by some to me that if the no-
take status of Chagos is maintained, then their ships would simply
line up along the border and catch the ﬁsh as they emerge. In other
words, why make things difﬁcult for the tuna ﬁshery? However, Si-
bert and Hampton (2003) model this situation in Paciﬁc archipela-
gos and ﬁnd that ‘‘the median lifetime displacement of skipjack
ranges from 420 to 470 nautical miles. The lifetime displacement
of yellowﬁn is about 20% less”. So, there is very likely to be a large
resident tuna population, a source, or reservoir perhaps, in the
archipelago. Nobody has much idea for that ocean. Sibert and
Hampton (2003) go onto comment on the assumption that these
tuna are high migratory: ‘‘The term, ‘highly migratory’ appears to
have no operational deﬁnition in relation to the natural history
of tunas. Rather, it is a legal term deﬁned only in the context of
the Law of the Sea.” Further: ‘‘. . .the results also suggest that Paciﬁc
Island countries can implement effective domestic management
policies to promote conservation and sustainable utilization of
tuna stocks within their EEZs”.
If this applies at all to Indian Ocean archipelagos too then there
is great beneﬁt to be gained from the large no-take region in Cha-
gos for this important pelagic group also.
3. Bycatch and wasted catch
The quantity of bycatch in the Indian Ocean tuna ﬁshery is also
unclear. It is barely known for the iconic turtles and seabirds, and
largely unknown for most other groups. It is known that sharks are
greatly desired and valued, for example, and that lines can be, and
are, set to preferentially target high value items such as shark ﬁns
for Asian markets. The FAO report that shark numbers in the Indian
Ocean are currently at about 10% of their stocks of not long ago,
and over half of the world’s oceanic pelagic sharks have declined
to the point where they are considered threatened by the World
Conservation Union. But quirky rules and poor monitoring also
actually permit gross under reporting of bycatch. Lancetﬁsh can
and have been caught as frequently as the targeted tuna. But their
ﬂesh is apparently soft and undesirable, so they are jerked off the
lines before they are landed on the deck. Whether, with their jaws
torn off, they can survive seems unlikely, but because they don’t
touch the deck they are not recordable as bycatch. In this way,
thousands of tons of carnivore are removed annually from the
ocean system. One ﬁsheries expert did assure me that in the Cha-
ogs context this only happened for the one year when the observa-
tion was reported.
An important element in the general ecology which is almost al-
ways overlooked, is the supply of bait for longliners. Some details
on the Atlantic ﬁshery are revealing, where apparently 500 million
squid are taken annually, largely for the supply of bait (Sloan,
2006). The Falklands and other southern Atlantic islands weredeveloped for their squid ﬁshery several years ago. You may be
familiar with those satellite images of light at night, in which
you will see that the Falklands squid ﬁshery lights up almost as
strongly as London or New York. The squid ﬁshery is apparently
in decline now, not surprisingly perhaps. However, to the ﬁshing
industry there is room for doubt: at one conference recently a ﬁsh-
eries expert admitted this decline but blamed. . . climate change!
As one scientiﬁc colleague put it: ‘‘It is difﬁcult enough to get peo-
ple to care about ﬁsh – what hope for squid!”. Another wasteful
problem comes from the observation (Sloan, 2006) that by the
end of a successful hunting trip, the bottom third of the tuna in
some ships’ holds may be too squashed from the weight of ﬁsh
above to be of much value. Some presumably can be used for
tinned cat food, but the rest is used as fertiliser for ﬁelds of crops.
To an ecologist, the energetics implied by inputting a top carnivore
into the base of a new food chain is astonishingly wasteful. Too
much of this sort of proﬂigacy could be the difference between col-
lapse of a species or its survival, and between continuing revenue
and beneﬁt or its loss. It is only possible because wild pelagic ﬁsh
capture is more akin to clear-fell logging than to harvesting.
4. What can be done?
Depressingly, probably little on a global scale will be done in
time regarding management of multi-national ﬁsheries over a
multitude of EEZs. The literature on excesses of the blue water
ﬁshing ﬂeet is huge, yet nothing much has happened. If proof is
needed, just look at past decades of history and the trends of ﬁsh-
ing intensity and ﬁsh stocks (Roberts, 2007). This applies even in
the generally much more regulated European Union and its North
Sea ﬁshing industry. Wakeﬁeld (2009) recently reviewed this
from a legal perspective and concluded that the situation is long
past being supportable, and even the EU itself recently concluded
that it has, in fact, messed up on a truly massive scale. The fact is
that we know the key facts, and have done so for many years, but
facts are not enough. It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd examples where indus-
trial ﬁshing has succeeded without collapsing the stocks. Tradi-
tionally the ﬂeets have just moved on: deeper, further offshore,
but there are fewer and fewer places left. As has been pointed
out for the whaling industry, from a company perspective it pays
not to ﬁsh sustainably, but rather to maximise a return now, liq-
uidate the asset and invest the earnings elsewhere, rather than to
save some for later. In an analysis of 27 Scombrid stocks over half
a century (mostly Atlantic and Paciﬁc but with the only two In-
dian Ocean stocks for which there was sufﬁcient data) Juan-Jorda
et al. (2010) commented: ‘‘Threat status has increased over time
with 20 out of 27 stocks having declined at a sufﬁcient rate to
qualify as treated according to IUCN A1 criteria”. These authors
also say with regard to the Atlantic stocks ‘‘This is equivalent to
a 69% decline in spawning stock biomass, 10% decline in the
mean age of adults and 9% decline in the mean body size of the
catches. . .” Despite this, some piecemeal activities are occasion-
ally proposed and even implemented, such as a meaningful level
of observers on ship, not always with the enthusiasm of the
ﬁshers.
5. The way ahead
The only sure way to protect a widely distributed ﬁshed stock is
to close off access to a large proportion of the spatial distribution of
the stock. More simply, the way ahead is with simply governed, no-
take protected areas, and the Chagos example is one of several new
initiatives (Nelson and Bradner, 2010). Given that most of the
oceans are a free-for-all and suffer the ‘tragedy of the commons’,
proﬂigate over-exploitation and waste probably will not change
in time in most places unless such ‘common’ access is restricted.
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single, determined and responsible jurisdiction. Where there is
complex jurisdiction, such as in EU waters, where it now takes four
barrels of fuel to catch one barrel of ﬁsh (Brander, 2008), it proba-
bly cannot change. Mostly, countries lack politicians courageous or
inﬂuential enough to try and do something where there are multi-
ple interests. Lobbying by special interests is clearly powerful of
course: in Britain, when several years ago a junior Minister opened
a marine science conference by saying that he supported no-take
MPAs around Britain, only two weeks passed before he was on
the main morning news back-tracking, saying that perhaps MPAs
were a bit excessive after all! In very fortunate contrast, a later se-
nior Minister (the UK Foreign Secretary, no less) then declared the
Chagos MPA no-take zone, this being possible because of its status
as a UK Overseas Territory. Its jurisdiction is simple (compared to
the EU at least) which made the move possible. Perhaps the solu-
tion can come only from such relatively simple jurisdictions, and
the larger they are, the more hope there is for overall sustainabil-
ity. The diameter of the Chagos no-take MPA is roughly the size of
the median range of some tuna species, so even though that MPA
was declared because of its reefs, its beneﬁt for pelagic species will
also be critical. As The Economist stated in August 2010 (p. 67,
based on Beare et al. (2010)) ‘‘...there is much to learn about ﬁsh-
eries biology. But one lesson is clear. Laying off, even just for six
years, has as big an effect on migratory ﬁsh as it does on sedentary
ones.”
This is what led to the tuna industry concern, even indignation,
described above – a rule being established in the free-for-all. This
was not just a shock (but was it really? see Worm et al., 2009)
but is a warning of possible regulation elsewhere too. Given the re-
cent call for many more such areas as noted earlier, no Minister
responsible for such areas in any ocean need be embarrassed any
longer for taking the correct and necessary action.Acknowledgements
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